Barakah Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3 lost its off-site electrical power supply on 17 May 2026, following a drone strike. The event placed attention on how the facility and the United Arab Emirates’ responsible authorities managed the loss of external power. It should not be taken to mean that every reactor at Barakah was affected: the reported loss concerned Unit 3, and the other units should not be described as experiencing the same condition without supporting evidence.
The International Atomic Energy Agency later sent a mission to review the response. Its assessment focused on the actions taken by the plant and UAE authorities in handling the event. It did not determine the cause of the drone strike, investigate responsibility for it, or evaluate the strike’s broader consequences. This distinction is important: the review concerned nuclear safety and emergency response arrangements, rather than a general inquiry into the incident’s security or geopolitical context.
Barakah is located in the Al Dhafra region of Abu Dhabi, in the western part of the UAE. The plant is operated by ENEC Operations, a joint venture subsidiary of the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) and Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO). The site comprises four APR1400 reactors, although the reported power-loss event specifically involved Unit 3.
When operating, the four units together are capable of producing about 40 terawatt-hours of electricity annually. That output is roughly one quarter of the UAE’s electricity needs, making Barakah a substantial part of the country’s power system. This national role provides context for the interest in the incident, but it does not establish that the strike interrupted electricity supply across the country or affected all four reactors. The IAEA review instead offers a focused account of how the relevant plant and government organizations responded after Unit 3 lost off-site power. Keeping the scope clear helps distinguish confirmed information about the response from questions about the strike itself and its wider effects.
A six-member International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mission reviewed the United Arab Emirates’ response to the loss of power at Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant from 12 to 20 October 2026. The visit was conducted at the UAE government’s request and followed an agreement reached during IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi’s visit to Barakah in June 2026. The mission’s purpose was to examine how the plant operator and national authorities managed the event and to identify lessons that could inform preparedness and response.
During the review, the team visited affected areas of the plant and emergency facilities. It examined operating procedures and emergency arrangements, considering how established processes were applied as events unfolded. The experts also met senior leaders and technical staff from Barakah and the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR). These discussions provided an opportunity to consider the decisions made at the plant, the coordination between the operator and regulators, and the measures used to manage safety throughout the response.
The assessment covered several connected areas: the actions taken at the facility, national emergency preparedness and response arrangements, lessons identified from the event, and the operator’s safety measures. The team considered both the practical response at Barakah and the broader systems supporting communication and emergency coordination. Its review included how information was shared with relevant authorities and the public, alongside the use of established procedures to guide response activities.
The mission’s central finding was that the UAE authorities and the plant responded appropriately to the power loss. The IAEA team noted prompt notifications, the application of established emergency procedures, and public communication as important elements of the response. Together, these actions supported an organized response and helped keep relevant parties informed. The review therefore focused not only on the immediate plant response, but also on how national arrangements and communication practices contributed to managing the event. Its findings provide a basis for considering lessons and maintaining effective safety and emergency preparedness at Barakah.
The IAEA mission identified several concrete practices that supported the UAE’s response to the loss of off-site power at Barakah. Authorities applied the Agency’s seven indispensable pillars for nuclear safety and security as a framework for managing the event, maintaining safety functions and coordinating the response. Off-site power was restored within a short period, limiting the duration of the disruption. The review also found effective regulatory oversight, with the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) monitoring the situation and supporting a disciplined approach to safety. These findings reflect the importance of clear responsibilities, timely decisions and coordination among organizations during an unexpected power interruption.
The mission further noted progress in safety procedures and operator training. Improvements made after the event helped strengthen readiness to respond to similar challenges, while efforts to apply lessons learned are supporting greater resilience across critical infrastructure. In this way, the response was not limited to restoring power: it also informed work to reduce vulnerabilities and improve preparedness. The review’s observations point to the value of incorporating operational experience into procedures, training and infrastructure planning, so that insights from a specific event can contribute to stronger arrangements over time.
Mission leader Amgad Shokr said FANR and the Barakah plant had demonstrated a commitment to safety and continuous improvement. The mission also recognized the technical competence of FANR, plant management and operating personnel, as well as national electrical-grid field operators. IAEA Deputy Director General Karine Herviou highlighted this competence, underscoring the contribution of specialists across both the nuclear facility and the wider power system. Together, the findings describe a response supported by capable personnel, regulatory attention and follow-up actions. The mission’s recognition of these strengths does not imply that improvement is complete; rather, it emphasizes that preparedness depends on sustaining oversight, learning from experience and reinforcing the systems on which nuclear safety relies.
The IAEA’s favorable assessment of the UAE’s response to the Barakah power loss also identified areas where further work is needed. The mission recommended strengthening emergency preparedness and response arrangements, improving the reliability and resilience of critical infrastructure, and reinforcing coordination among the organizations involved. These measures can help ensure that nuclear safety and nuclear security arrangements operate in a connected and mutually supportive way, particularly during an unusual event. The recommendations are intended to build on the response demonstrated at Barakah and to support continued improvement across the national framework.
The agency advised the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) and the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) to continue implementing organizational and technical measures identified through their review of lessons learned. This ongoing work includes applying relevant findings to procedures, capabilities, and cooperation between responsible parties. Reviews after an event can help organizations determine which arrangements worked as intended and where further adjustments may strengthen readiness. Continuing to address the findings will allow the UAE to turn operational experience into practical improvements, while maintaining appropriate oversight and attention to both safety and security.
FANR Director General Hamad Al Kaabi said the UAE would continue cooperating with the IAEA and national partners, drawing on experience to reinforce safety, security, and emergency readiness. He also emphasized the importance of protecting people and the environment. The commitment reflects the role of cooperation in supporting consistent preparedness across the organizations responsible for nuclear operations and national response. The IAEA’s review confirmed that the response to the Barakah power loss was effective; it did not suggest that preparedness work is complete. Rather, the assessment recognizes a capable response while underscoring the continuing effort required to improve readiness, strengthen essential systems, and apply lessons as circumstances and operational experience evolve.





